INIdentity Noir
Simulated environment

Case 001 · Priority One

The Deploy
Nobody Approved

An identity-security detective case. Follow the change past the config diff to the identity that made it, then contain it without breaking what depends on it.

Open the case file →

Live simulation

Evidence, not assumptions.

Incident active
01Brief02Investigate03Diagnose04Remediate05Verify06Debrief
CONFIDENTIAL · SIMULATION

Opening briefing · 2:44 PM UTC

Checkout is failing.
Nobody deployed anything.

At 2:31 PM, payment timeouts jumped from zero to 412 per minute. Checkout success has fallen from 99.5% to 61.4%. Traffic is normal and the payment provider reports healthy. The on-call channel says nobody has shipped anything since this morning’s release.

ObjectiveFind the root cause
ConstraintStop it from recurring
Potential suspectsRelease · Provider · Attacker · Automation
All telemetry is deterministic and simulated. No live production system is connected.

Behind the build

A game on the surface.
A repeatable demo motion underneath.

This case turns an identity-driven outage into a guided evaluation asset. The browser runs deterministic fixtures; a production implementation would read HR, directory, git, and cloud through permissioned, read-only connectors.

Conceptual architecture
◫Browser experienceCase UI · Scorecard
→
◆Scenario engineTyped fixture · Rules
→
◆Identity sourcesHR · Directory · Git · Cloud
→
◆Identity governanceOwners · Reviews · SoD
Governed estate
◆HR systemSource of truth
→
◆DirectoryAD · LDAP
◆Git & CIWhere agents act
→
◆KubernetesRBAC · Prod
Terraformprovisions the demo cluster, CI runners, service accounts, and RBAC so every run starts from the same state

Live implementation

How the pieces fit

  • HR systemis authoritative for who works here and triggers joiner, mover, and leaver events.
  • Directoryholds human accounts and groups over LDAP; it has no record of most agents.
  • Git & CIis where agents act, and where bypass lists quietly grant approval rights.
  • Governancecorrelates owners, entitlements, reviews, and policy across all of the above.

Prototype boundaries

What is simulated

  • In this sitedeterministic identity records, audit logs, entitlements, reviews, and scoring.
  • In productionread-only connectors (SCIM, LDAP, REST/JSON), real HR events, and approval workflows.
  • Safe by designno credentials, employee data, or write access to any system.

Skills this case demonstrates

Identity investigation→IGA workflows
Leaver trace→Joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle
Entitlement review→Least privilege · JIT access
SoD check→SOX change management
Evidence report→Audit & compliance
Persona playbook→Business-level selling
Scenario as data→Reusable collateral
CASE / 002

Extend the system

Add the next incident as data, not a redesign.

Case 002 is one typed fixture — evidence, timeline, suspects, remediation options, scoring keys, and its own sales playbook — running in this same shell.

Solutions Engineer mode · Case 001

From technical proof
to customer value.

10
minute path
Teaching insight

Your leaver process is complete for people. It isn’t complete for what people create.

In this case the departing engineer’s accounts were disabled within two hours. The AI agent they owned kept admin and deploy rights for three weeks, with no owner and no review. Rollback ends the outage; ownership and scoped access end the pattern.

01

CISO

DiscoverHow many non-human identities can change production today, and could you name an owner for each by end of day?

DemonstrateThe change chain with zero humans in it, and suspending one identity without breaking six pipelines.

OutcomeA defensible count of ownerless, over-privileged identities.

02

Internal audit

DiscoverWhen a service account or agent makes a production change, what evidence shows it was approved?

DemonstrateThe SoD conflict, the never-reviewed status, and the generated evidence report.

OutcomeFewer change-management exceptions and faster evidence collection.

03

IAM program owner

DiscoverAre service accounts and AI agents in your certification campaigns, or only people?

DemonstrateOwner, entitlements, and review scope side by side for one agent.

OutcomeNon-human identities reviewed in the same campaigns as people.

04

Platform engineering

DiscoverWhich automations sit on your branch-protection bypass lists, and who reviews that list?

DemonstrateHow a routine “optimization” reached production with no approval, and why rollback alone recurs.

OutcomeJust-in-time deploy rights that don’t slow releases.

05

HR operations

DiscoverWhen someone leaves, does offboarding cover the systems and agents they own, or only their own accounts?

DemonstrateThe leaver that worked for the person and missed what the person created.

OutcomeOwnership transfer as a standard leaver step.

06

Controller

DiscoverWhat does an hour of degraded checkout cost, and what does remediating a SOX control deficiency cost?

DemonstrateRevenue at risk during the outage next to the compliance exception it created.

OutcomeA business case tying identity controls to revenue and audit cost.

Suggested path

  1. Teach before you demoFlat traffic, 61% checkout, and “nobody deployed anything.”
  2. Follow the changeConfig diff → PR with zero approvals → the actor is an agent.
  3. Follow the identityDeparted owner, standing rights, never reviewed, SoD conflict.
  4. Choose containmentWhy rollback recurs and deletion breaks finance exports.
  5. Prove it to auditVerify recovery, review the score, export the evidence report.

Proof of value · 4 weeks

Two systems: one CI/CD pipeline and one production cluster. Read-only discovery first; no write actions before week 3.

  • Find every non-human identity with production write access100% inventoried across both pilot systems by end of week 1
  • Give each one an accountable ownerOwner assigned, or identity flagged for removal, by end of week 2
  • Catch ownership gaps when people leaveOwned identities routed for review within 24 hours of an HR termination
  • Review agents alongside peopleOne campaign including non-human identities; ≥90% of decisions within 10 business days
  • Remove standing deploy rights without slowing deliveryOne pipeline on approval-gated access, adding under 5 minutes per deploy

Exit criterionAudit accepts the generated SoD and change-evidence report as control evidence for the pilot systems.

Objections & responses

“We already offboard people in Active Directory.”

That’s the part that worked in this case. The gap is identities people own but aren’t: service accounts, bots, and agents with no HR record to trigger removal.

“Service accounts are an engineering problem.”

Engineering creates them; audit finds them. Governance decides who owns each one, what it can touch, and for how long, without taking the pipeline away from engineering.

“Just-in-time access will slow our releases.”

Scope approval to production-write actions and pre-approve routine windows. The POV measures added deploy time against a threshold your platform team sets.

“We can’t connect a new tool to CI and cloud.”

Start read-only on two systems. Write actions stay with your team until the POV has met its criteria.

Evaluation criteria to leave with the buyer

  • Discovers service accounts and AI agents across cloud, SaaS, and CI, not only directory accounts.
  • Transfers or revokes owned identities automatically from the HR leaver event.
  • Reviews non-human identities in the same campaigns as people.
  • Suspends one identity without forcing a rotation of shared credentials.
  • Evaluates separation-of-duties policy for non-human actors in change pipelines.

Sample RFP response

Describe how the solution discovers and governs non-human identities, including AI agents, and ensures each has an accountable owner.

The solution discovers service accounts, API tokens, and AI agents through read-only connectors to cloud, SaaS, CI/CD, and directory sources, and correlates each identity to the entitlements it holds. Every non-human identity requires an accountable human owner; when an owner leaves, the HR termination event routes their identities to a successor for review within a defined SLA. Non-human identities are certified alongside people, evaluated against separation-of-duties policy, and can be suspended individually without rotating shared credentials. Every decision is logged as audit evidence.

Open questions for product

  • Can ownership be inferred from git and cloud activity when an owner field is stale?
  • Should a bypass-list entry be treated as an entitlement that goes through review?
  • Can an agent’s write actions be suspended while its read-only jobs, like finance exports, keep running?